Explanation across
the disciplines
September 14-15, 2018
Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT
Keynote Speakers:
Tania Lombrozo (Psychology, UC-Berkeley)
Michael Strevens (Philosophy, NYU)
Organizers:
Collin Rice (Philosophy, Bryn Mawr)
Mark Newman (Philosophy, Rhodes)
Kareem Khalifa (Philosophy, Middlebury)
Sponsored by the Alliance to Advance Liberal Arts Colleges (AALAC).
Conference Home -- Program -- Abstracts
Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT
Keynote Speakers:
Tania Lombrozo (Psychology, UC-Berkeley)
Michael Strevens (Philosophy, NYU)
Organizers:
Collin Rice (Philosophy, Bryn Mawr)
Mark Newman (Philosophy, Rhodes)
Kareem Khalifa (Philosophy, Middlebury)
Sponsored by the Alliance to Advance Liberal Arts Colleges (AALAC).
Conference Home -- Program -- Abstracts
DESCRIPTION:
Explanations are ubiquitous. Scientists reveal nature and society's workings with them; mathematicians construct proofs with them; historians reconstruct the past with them; even philosophers use them to articulate our reasons for belief, action, and moral decision-making. Explanation is equally important as a form of communication; as teachers, it is indispensable for educating our students.
Despite the central role that explanation plays in our lives and in our classrooms, there is little consensus on what an explanation actually is. Perhaps explanations are just inferences, where what is being explained is logically deduced from previous events. Or maybe they are descriptions of causal interactions. Or possibly they are just sets of apparently unconnected ideas that when synthesized make what was originally less familiar to us more familiar. For each of these interpretations, there seem to be strong examples which provide support for them, across academic disciplines, from physics to philosophy. But for each there are also strong counterexamples. So what are we to think about explanation?
At least part of the confusion about explanations, we believe, arises from the lack of organized discussion between academic disciplines about the subject. Different vocabularies, methods, foci–not to mention the much-maligned "silo thinking" of disciplines and departments–thwart fruitful interdisciplinary discussions regarding the nature and structure of explanation. In fact, even members within a single discipline–e.g. philosophers of science and theorists of knowledge–rarely talk to each other about their highly divergent approaches to explaining explanation.
During this workshop, we begin to remedy this situation by bringing together scientists (broadly construed) and philosophers from AALAC institutions to discuss connections between their disciplines and sub-disciplines, using explanation as our focus. Workshop themes include: Are there significant differences or similarities in how explanations work across various sciences? How do these common or differing themes transform as we move to look at explanations in the humanities? What case studies illustrate these differences or similarities? How can we use what we learn about different types of explanations to enhance our understanding through different disciplines? Given that we do not want merely our students to know and describe, but also to understand and explain, how can deeper reflection on explanation improve our pedagogy?
The workshop has three desired outcomes: (1) to generate a variety of models for scholarly and pedagogical collaboration between philosophers and non-philosophers on topics that concern the methodology of different fields; (2) to provide a richer array of examples from the sciences and humanities that will be of use to philosophers when educating undergraduates about explanation; (3) to provide philosophical frameworks that will be of use to scientists and other non-philosophers when educating undergraduates about explanation.
We will assess our success in achieving these outcomes through two email questionnaires: one immediately after the workshop, and a follow-up email several months later. Should there be sufficient interest, we will use funds from Rhodes or Middlebury to create a website as a public repository for these ideas, and to organize differently themed but similarly structured workshops.
Explanations are ubiquitous. Scientists reveal nature and society's workings with them; mathematicians construct proofs with them; historians reconstruct the past with them; even philosophers use them to articulate our reasons for belief, action, and moral decision-making. Explanation is equally important as a form of communication; as teachers, it is indispensable for educating our students.
Despite the central role that explanation plays in our lives and in our classrooms, there is little consensus on what an explanation actually is. Perhaps explanations are just inferences, where what is being explained is logically deduced from previous events. Or maybe they are descriptions of causal interactions. Or possibly they are just sets of apparently unconnected ideas that when synthesized make what was originally less familiar to us more familiar. For each of these interpretations, there seem to be strong examples which provide support for them, across academic disciplines, from physics to philosophy. But for each there are also strong counterexamples. So what are we to think about explanation?
At least part of the confusion about explanations, we believe, arises from the lack of organized discussion between academic disciplines about the subject. Different vocabularies, methods, foci–not to mention the much-maligned "silo thinking" of disciplines and departments–thwart fruitful interdisciplinary discussions regarding the nature and structure of explanation. In fact, even members within a single discipline–e.g. philosophers of science and theorists of knowledge–rarely talk to each other about their highly divergent approaches to explaining explanation.
During this workshop, we begin to remedy this situation by bringing together scientists (broadly construed) and philosophers from AALAC institutions to discuss connections between their disciplines and sub-disciplines, using explanation as our focus. Workshop themes include: Are there significant differences or similarities in how explanations work across various sciences? How do these common or differing themes transform as we move to look at explanations in the humanities? What case studies illustrate these differences or similarities? How can we use what we learn about different types of explanations to enhance our understanding through different disciplines? Given that we do not want merely our students to know and describe, but also to understand and explain, how can deeper reflection on explanation improve our pedagogy?
The workshop has three desired outcomes: (1) to generate a variety of models for scholarly and pedagogical collaboration between philosophers and non-philosophers on topics that concern the methodology of different fields; (2) to provide a richer array of examples from the sciences and humanities that will be of use to philosophers when educating undergraduates about explanation; (3) to provide philosophical frameworks that will be of use to scientists and other non-philosophers when educating undergraduates about explanation.
We will assess our success in achieving these outcomes through two email questionnaires: one immediately after the workshop, and a follow-up email several months later. Should there be sufficient interest, we will use funds from Rhodes or Middlebury to create a website as a public repository for these ideas, and to organize differently themed but similarly structured workshops.