Race in the Social Sciences
with Richard Lauer
Race has been at the forefront of public and scientific discourse. While the Black Lives Matter movement has put a spotlight on racial injustices related to policing, a larger network of racial inequalities with respect to income, wealth, health, education, occupational opportunities, and housing lurks in the background. If we are to understand these inequalities—much less change them—then we must understand what race is.
Yet, the nature of race is contested throughout the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences. Constructionists hold that races exist but only in virtue of certain social conditions. Antirealists hold that while our mistaken ideas about race have had tangible consequences, races do not exist. Biological realists hold that races exist in virtue of certain biological conditions, while making sure to avoid the ills of scientific racism. The current debate between proponents of these different positions appears to be at a standstill—in no small part because of deeper disagreements about the very methods used to evaluate different proposals for what race is.
Race in the Social Sciences offers a way out of this impasse and in the process offers a novel position regarding the ontology of race. Its driving idea is that race’s role in empirically successful social science only requires a "thin" metaphysics of race. In defending this position, we use race as a touchstone for engaging several perennial issues in the philosophy of science and the methodology of the social sciences: When do we have sufficient scientific evidence to claim that something is real? What is the relationship between quantitative and qualitative social science? What is the appropriate scientific response when evidence underdetermines a hypothesis? How should social, political, and moral values inform science? What is the relationship between the social and biological sciences?
Yet, the nature of race is contested throughout the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences. Constructionists hold that races exist but only in virtue of certain social conditions. Antirealists hold that while our mistaken ideas about race have had tangible consequences, races do not exist. Biological realists hold that races exist in virtue of certain biological conditions, while making sure to avoid the ills of scientific racism. The current debate between proponents of these different positions appears to be at a standstill—in no small part because of deeper disagreements about the very methods used to evaluate different proposals for what race is.
Race in the Social Sciences offers a way out of this impasse and in the process offers a novel position regarding the ontology of race. Its driving idea is that race’s role in empirically successful social science only requires a "thin" metaphysics of race. In defending this position, we use race as a touchstone for engaging several perennial issues in the philosophy of science and the methodology of the social sciences: When do we have sufficient scientific evidence to claim that something is real? What is the relationship between quantitative and qualitative social science? What is the appropriate scientific response when evidence underdetermines a hypothesis? How should social, political, and moral values inform science? What is the relationship between the social and biological sciences?
relevant publications
This project was inspired by Richard's work on the methodology of social ontology. That sparked our first article, Do the Social Sciences Vindicate Races' Reality?. Our second article, Should Ordinary Race Talk be Ontologically Privileged?, chiefly intervenes on methodological issues in the metaphysics of race. We are now working on a third paper that continues to develop our methodological program, while also presenting our core metaphysical position.