philosophy And the social sciences
I'm in the very early stages of a (book?) project. Its core ideas are as follows: (1) there are no deep differences between social- and natural-scientific methodologies. Because of this, (2) the criteria used in the scientific realism debates should be used to adjudicate the social sciences' ontological commitments. Moreover, (3) few (if any) social sciences meet the criteria used in the scientific realism debates, so (4) some variant of scientific antirealism is appropriate for most social entities. Before embarking on this project, I had used the findings and tools of the social sciences to make various forays into epistemology and philosophy of science; used general philosophy of science to analyze the methodologies of the social sciences; and had used social-scientific examples in some of my papers in general philosophy of science. I continue these sorts of cross-cutting endeavors as side-projects.
- I'm a member of the Steering Committee for the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable and the Scientific Committee for the European Network for the Philosophy of Social Science.
- I started the Philosophy of Social Science Network on Facebook. Feel free to join us.
- Along with Randall Harp, I organized the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in Burlington, VT. April 12-13, 2019. Because I'm a glutton for punishment, I'm also co-organizing the 2020 roundtable with Mark Risjord.
Articles and Book Chapters
- In progress. Paper on the social epistemology of scientific instruments. (with Sandy Goldberg)
- In progress. Paper on perspective-taking in the natural and social sciences.
- in progress. Paper on collective agents, scientific antirealism, and the social sciences. (with Richard Lauer)
- in progress. Paper on race, scientific antirealism, and the social sciences. (with Richard Lauer)
- Forthcoming. Understanding, truth, and epistemic goals. (This is a general philosophy of science paper that uses some social-scientific examples).
- 2019. idealizations and understanding: much ado about nothing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1564337. (with Emily Sullivan. This is a general philosophy of science paper that uses some social-scientific examples).
- 2019. Is Verstehen scientific understanding? Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 49(4): 282-306. doi: 10.1177/0048393119847104.
- 2016. Realism and antirealism. in Rosenberg, A. and L. McIntyre (eds.), Routledge companion to philosophy of social science (London: Routledge). (with Randall Harp)
- 2015. What are stylized facts? Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (2): 143-156. (with Leticia Arroyo Abad)
- 2015. Why pursue unification? a social-epistemological puzzle. Theoria 30 (3): 431-447. (with Randall Harp)
- 2013. Review of Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard (eds.) Social Epistemology. Mind 122 (486): 535-540.
- 2010c. Contrastive explanations as social accounts. Social Epistemology. 24 (4): 265-286.
- 2010b. Social constructivism and the aims of science. Social Epistemology. 24 (1): 45–61.
- 2004. Erotetic contextualism, data-generating procedures, and sociological explanations of social mobility. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1): 38-54.